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Abstract
We study the stochastic dynamics of evolutionary games, and focus on the so-called
‘stochastic slowdown’ effect, previously observed in (Altrock et al., 2010) for simple
evolutionary dynamics. Slowdown here refers to the fact that a beneficial mutation may
take longer to fixate than a neutral one. More precisely, the fixation time conditioned
on the mutant taking over can show a maximum at intermediate selection strength.
We show that this phenomenon is present in the Prisoner’s Dilemma, and also discuss
counterintuitive slowdown and speedup in coexistence games. In order to establish the
microscopic origins of these phenomena, we calculate the average sojourn times. This
allows us to identify the transient states which contribute most to the slowdown effect,
and enables us to provide an understanding of slowdown in the takeover of a small
group of cooperators by defectors in the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Defection spreads fast
initially, but the final steps to takeover can be delayed substantially. The analysis of
coexistence games reveals even more intricate non-monotonic behavior. In small pop-
ulations, the conditional average fixation time can show multiple extrema as a function
of the selection strength, e.g., slowdown, speedup, and slowdown again. We classify
generic 2× 2 games with respect to the possibility to observe non-monotonic behavior
of the conditional average fixation time as a function of selection strength.
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The mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary games
1. Introduction
The theory of evolutionary games describes the effects of selection, reproduction and
mutation in competitive environments of interacting agents. In an evolutionary setting,
reproductive success (or fitness) depends on the performance in the evolutionary game.
The strategies, or types of the game are assumed to be hard-wired to an individual’s
genotype, and passed on from parent to offspring. Natural selection acts, such that
more successful strategies spread faster over time than less successful strategies.
Whether a particular strategy is successful or not depends on the state of the overall
population (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer et al.,
1979; Zeeman, 1980; Nowak and Sigmund, 2004). An individual’s fitness will generally
depend on the frequencies of all strategies present in the population. This is referred
to as ‘frequency dependent selection’ (Maynard Smith, 1982a; Weibull, 1995; Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1998; Nowak, 2006a). For large populations, such systems are tradi-
tionally described by deterministic equations of motion, typically replicator dynamics or
close variations (Schuster and Sigmund, 1983; Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1998; Gintis,
2000; Sandholm, 2010). We here focus instead on the stochastic evolutionary dynam-
ics of two strategies, a mutant type A and a wildtype B, in a finite population of size
N .
A significant body of literature is now available on the stochastic dynamics of evolu-
tionary processes, and a number of phenomena induced by stochasticity have now
been identified (Nowak et al., 2004; Antal and Scheuring, 2006; Altrock et al., 2010;
Traulsen et al., 2006a, 2005; Traulsen and Hauert, 2009; Claussen and Traulsen, 2005;
Claussen, 2007; Cremer et al., 2008; Bladon et al., 2010). Once all individuals of a
given type have been eliminated, they are never re-introduced in the absence of mu-
tation. Naturally, a stochastic evolutionary process without mutations ends up in such
an absorbing state. If selection is sufficiently weak, this allows the fixation of disfavored
types, i.e., the possibility that a stochastic evolutionary process ends up in configura-
tions consisting of a type which does not have the highest fitness (Nowak et al., 2004).
Fixation will ultimately also occur in coexistence games, where the replicator dynamics
predicts a mixed asymptotic state. However, in this case the time-to-fixation diverges
with increasing selection (Traulsen et al., 2006b, 2007b).
Here, we analyze the phenomenon of ‘stochastic slowdown’ observed in games be-
tween two types, a wildtype and a mutant (Altrock et al., 2010). Assuming an evolution-
ary game in which the mutant is always better off than the wildtype (no matter what the
configuration of the population is), it was shown that increasing the selection pressure
(and with it the evolutionary advantage of the mutant) fixation into the all-mutant state
can slow down. In other words, fixation can take longer on average at non-zero selec-
tion strength than in the neutral case of no selection at all. Consequently, a beneficial
mutation can take longer to take over a population than a neutral one. This somewhat
counter-intuitive effect was investigated in (Altrock et al., 2010), where a number of rel-
atively simple evolutionary setups are analyzed and constraints on parameters such as
the population size required to observe this kind of stochastic slowdown are derived.
Our goal here is to extend these observations to the case of evolutionary games. Specif-
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ically we focus on the Prisoner’s Dilemma game and on coexistence games. We provide
an in-depth analysis of the transient dynamics of stochastic slowdown, and investigate
what states of the system contribute most to the slowdown effect. To this end, we calcu-
late the average conditional sojourn times, i.e. the average time the system spends in
any particular configuration before fixating into the all-mutant state, and provide a weak
selection approximation.
In Section 2 we describe the general setup of evolutionary dynamics in finite populations
with two types, and define the quantities of interest, in particular fixation and sojourn
times. In Section 3, we introduce a minimal model in which slowdown can be observed
and analyzed, which allows us to develop an intuitive understanding of stochastic slow-
down. In Section 4 we introduce the model describing interactions between individuals
of two different types in the setting of an evolutionary game. Section 5 contains our
main results. Further discussion and conclusions can be found in Section 6. Some of
the technical details of our analysis can be found in the Appendix. Table 1 gives a list of
symbols used in the main part of this article, Table 2 gives a list of symbols exclusively
used in Section 3.
Symbol Definition
A, B Types (strategies) in the population. A is the invading mutant, B is the wildtype.
N Population size.
i, j Number of individuals of type A, also called state of the system. States 0 and N are
absorbing.
T+i Transition probability from state i to state i+ 1.
T−i Transition probability from state i to state i− 1.
Pt(j) Probability that the population is in state j at time t. Time is discrete.
Pt(j|i) Conditional probability that the population is in state j at time t when it was in state i
at time 0.
pt(j|i) Conditional probability to enter state j at time t, when it started from state i at time 0.
φij Probability to ever visit state j, starting in state i.
φi Fixation probability in state N , starting in state i, φi = φiN , and 1− φi = φi0.
ri Probability to ever return to state i, once there.
qt(j|i) Conditional probability of time t spent in state j, starting from i.
tij Average sojourn time in j, starting in i: First moment of qt(j|i), tij =∑∞t=1 t qt(j|i).
ti Unconditional average fixation time starting from i.
t0i , tNi Conditional average fixation time into 0 or N , respectively, starting from i.
a, b, c, d Payoffs of a single interaction between individuals.
piA, piB Average payoffs of A, B in a well-mixed population of fixed size N .
u, v Parameters that characterize the evolutionary game in state i. piA − piB = u i+ v.
β Selection intensity. β = 0 means neutral evolution.
fA, fB Fitness of A, B, e.g., fA = eβ piA .
f¯ Expected fitness in the population. In state i we have f¯ = (i fA + (N − i)fB)/N .
i∗ Points where T+i∗ = T
−
i∗ , i.e. i
∗ = 0, N, −u/v.
g+i , g
−
i Game-dependent part of the transition probabilities T
±
i in state i.
Dˆ1, Dˆ2, Dˇ1 Coefficients of the weak selection expansion of tij that only depend on i, j, N .
E˜1, E˜2, Eˆ1,
Eˆ2, Eˇ1, Eˇ2
Coefficients of the weak selection expansions of ti, t0i , tNi that only depend on i, N .
Hk Harmonic number, Hk =
∑k
l=1 1/l.
Table 1: Symbols used in this article, roughly in order of their appearance.
Section 3 has its own table of symbols.
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2. Model
General Setup
We model a well-mixed population of sizeN , subject to a birth-death process in discrete
time of overlapping generations that keeps the size of the population constant. We
consider the interaction of two types, a mutant A and a wildtype B. We denote the
number of mutants in the population by i, and accordingly the number of individuals of
the wildtype is N − i.
The birth-death process is fully characterized by the probabilities to increase or de-
crease the number of individuals of the mutant type at each time step, i.e. whether to
increase i to i+1 (a mutant displaces an individual of the wildtype) or whether to reduce
it to i− 1 (an individual of the wildtype displaces a mutant), or not to make any change
at all. We denote the probability of a the occurrence of a transition from i to i + 1 in a
given time step by T+i , and T
−
i accordingly denotes the probability that a transition from
i to i − 1 occurs. The quantity 1 − T+i − T−i is then the probability that the population
remains in state i. We exclude mutations such that the states i = 0 and i = N are
absorbing, i.e., we have T+0 = T
−
N = 0. The dynamics of the system is then governed
by the following master equation
Pt+1(j) = (1− T+j − T−j )Pt(j) + T+j−1Pt(j − 1) + T−j+1Pt(j + 1), (1)
where Pt(j) denotes the probability of finding the system in state j at time t. Similarly
paths can be conditioned on an initial state i. Writing Pt(j|i) for the conditional proba-
bility of finding the system in state j exactly t time steps after starting the dynamics in
state i, we have
Pt+1(j|i) = (1− T+j − T−j )Pt(j|i) + T+j−1Pt(j − 1|i) + T−j+1Pt(j + 1|i). (2)
Fixation Probabilities
If the system is started from a configuration with i individuals of the mutant type, then it
will eventually fixate in one of the two absorbing states at i = 0 or i = N . The probability
that this fixation occurs at i = N (the mutant type takes over the entire population) is
denoted by φi, where i is the initial number of mutants. Accordingly, fixation at i = 0
(mutant type goes extinct) occurs with probability 1− φi.
In order to calculate fixation probabilities it is useful to first consider the probabilities
pt(j|i) describing the event that the system enters state j exactly t time steps after
having been started in state i. We stress that this is not the same as the probability
Pt(j|i) of being found in state j after a lag period of t time steps and having started at
i. Instead, pt(j|i) only captures events in which the system was in a state different from
j at time step t − 1 after starting from i. One then has the following backward master
equation (Goel and Richter-Dyn, 1974; Karlin and Taylor, 1975)
pt+1(j|i) = (1− T+i − T−i )pt(j|i) + T+i pt(j|i+ 1) + T−i pt(j|i− 1), (3)
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where again i denotes the initial state, and j the state t time steps later. Summing over
all t yields the recursion
φij = (1− T+i − T−i )φij + T+i φi+1j + T−i φi−1j . (4)
Here φij =
∑∞
t=0 pt(j|i) is the probability that the system reaches state j at any later
time if the system is started in state i. The solution of this recursion is given in Appendix
Appendix A. The fixation probability of a group of i mutants of type A is φi = φiN .
Similarly, 1−φi = φi0 is the probability that the mutation goes extinct in the population if
there are i mutants initially. Once the pt(j|i) are known, it is straightforward to compute
the average time to fixation, conditioned for example on cases in which the mutant
takes over. The average conditional fixation time is given by
∑∞
t=0 t pt(N |i)/φi (Antal
and Scheuring, 2006; Traulsen and Hauert, 2009). Recall here that pt(N |i) denotes the
probability that the system reaches state N precisely t time steps after starting in state
i. More generally, the kth-moment of the conditional fixation times can be obtained as∑∞
t=0 t
k pt(N |i)/φi.
Sojourn Times
Sojourn times are a helpful tool with which to characterize the transient dynamics of
stochastic processes with fixation (Ohtsuki et al., 2007). The sojourn time tij is the
average total time a population started in state i spends in the state with j mutants
before absorption. This includes returns to state j and time steps in which the system
remains in j, i.e., tij is the average total number of time steps spent in j until absorption
if started from i.
Unconditional sojourn times: We can identify the sojourn times by considering the es-
cape process from each of the internal states i = 1, . . . , N − 1 (Ewens, 2004). Once in
i at time step t, the probability ri that the process is found in state i again at any future
time step t′ > t is given by
ri = (1− T+i − T−i ) + T+i φi+1i + T−i φi−1i. (5)
Then, the conditional probability for the system starting in state i to spend a total time
of t > 0 steps in state j before absorption is
qt(j|i) = φij rt−1j (1− rj). (6)
The sojourn time at j, conditioned on a starting point i is obtained as the first moment
of this distribution
tij = φij(1− rj)
∞∑
t=1
t rt−1j =
φij
1− rj . (7)
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This expression can be simplified further, noting that ri = 1+T+i (φi+1i−1)+T−i (φi−1i−
1). Consequently, the average sojourn time in state j, starting in i, reads
tij =
φij
T+j (1− φj+1j) + T−j (1− φj−1j)
. (8)
The average life-time ti, i.e., the unconditional fixation time (see, e.g., Altrock and
Traulsen (2009b)) with initial condition i is then given by the sum over all average so-
journ times, ti =
∑N−1
j=1 tij .
Conditional sojourn times: We will now consider average sojourn and fixation times,
conditioned on paths ending in the all-mutant state. We can here use general results
relating conditional to unconditional quantities, see (Ewens, 2004). If we denote sojourn
times conditioned on fixation on the all-mutant state by tNij then one has t
N
ij = φj/φitij .
The conditional fixation time tNi follows as
tNi =
N−1∑
j=1
φj
φi
tij =
N−1∑
j=1
φj
φi
φij
T+j (1− φj+1j) + T−j (1− φj−1j)
. (9)
We note that the average time to fixation conditioned on arrival in the state 0 (i.e. a
population free of mutants) can be obtained in an analogous manner as
t0i =
N−1∑
j=1
1− φj
1− φi tij . (10)
The expressions for average fixation and sojourn times are used in Section 5 to un-
derstand the statistical mechanics of trajectories conditioned on fixation of the mutant
based on mutant-wildtype interactions cast into an evolutionary game. Before we get to
these results we discuss a simpler model capturing the essence of probabilistic fixation
of an advantageous mutant. The benefit of this excursion is a better understanding of
the slowdown effect that we discuss for the evolutionary Prisoner’ s Dilemma game.
3. Simplified Model for Stochastic Slowdown
In order to develop a first intuitive understanding of the stochastic spread of a beneficial
mutation let us consider a simplified model of the birth-death process. In order to dis-
entangle the different effects contributing to the occurrence of slowdown, we focus on a
basic model with only a small number of possible states. The left-hand panel of Figure
1 shows the setup of a general birth-death process in a population of N individuals. We
now take a coarse-grained view of the system and collect all states i = 2, 3, . . . , N − 1
into a subsystem S, as shown in the right-hand panel of the figure. The birth-death
process can be thought of the hopping dynamics between four different states, i = 0,
i = 1, S and i = N , where i = 0 and i = N are absorbing. State i = 1 is characterized
fully by T+1 and T
−
1 . These also determine the probability q = T
+
1 /(T
+
1 +T
−
1 ) with which
the next move of the system (out of state 1) is into state S and not into state 0. The
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q
1−q p1, τ1
i =0 i =1 i =N
S
B
i =0 i =1 i =2 i =N−1 i =N...
A
T−1
T+1
T−2
T+N−1
1−p1, τN
Figure 1: Illustration of the birth-death model of a population of size N (panel A), characterized by the
transition probabilities in each state, T±i . Panel B shows the simplified model in which states i = 2, . . . , N−
1 are aggregated into a coarse-grained state S characterized by the variables p1, τ1 and τN (see text for
details).
average time the system stays in state i = 1 is s1 = 1/(T+1 + T
−
1 ). Interestingly, this is
also the average waiting time conditioned on the event that the next move is to state S
as well as the average waiting time conditioned on the event that the next move is to
state i = 0 (Antal and Scheuring, 2006; Taylor et al., 2006).
We assume now that the system has entered state S at time t. The previous state at
t−1 then must have been i = 1. In this situation state S is characterized by the following
three quantities: (i) The probability p1 that the next state after leaving S is i = 1; (ii) the
average time τ1 that elapses between entering state S and returning to state i = 1; (iii)
the average time τN that elapses between entering state S and reaching state i = N .
This is illustrated in the right-hand panel of Figure 1. We stress that the quantities T±i
depicted in the left-hand panel of Figure 1 are the probabilities with which a birth-death
event occurs in the next time step. The quantity 1 − T+i − T−i is the probability that no
event occurs in the next step, which may well be positive. The quantity p1 illustrated in
the right-hand panel of the figure is the probability that the next hop at any time is into
state i = 1 if the system is in S, the next hop will be towards state N with probability
1− p1. The difference between the two cases is indicated by the two types of arrows in
Figure 1.
We now address the average conditional fixation time tN1 . Assume that the system
starts in state i = 1. It can then reach i = N by first hopping to state S and then to
i = N without returning to i = 1. This will occur with probability ρ(0) = q(1 − p1) and
will on average take s1 + τN time steps. Alternatively, the system may enter S, return to
i = 1 precisely once, then return to S and then to i = N . The probability for this event
is ρ(1) = q(p1q)(1 − p1) and it will require 2s1 + τ1 + τN time steps. Analogously, the
probability that exactly k returns to state i = 1 occur before absorption at i = N occurs
is
ρ(k) = q(p1q)
k(1− p1). (11)
The time required for this trajectory is s1+τN +k(s1+τ1). The probability for the particle
to end up at N eventually (and not at i = 0) is then
φ1 =
∞∑
k=0
ρ(k) =
q(1− p1)
1− p1q . (12)
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The conditional probability that the particle returns to site i = 1 exactly k times given
that it is eventually absorbed at N is then
ρN (k) =
ρ(k)
φ1
= (p1q)
k(1− p1q). (13)
Averaging the time required for these processes over k, we find for the average condi-
tional fixation time starting at i = 1
tN1 =
∑
k
ρN (k) [s1 + τN + k(s1 + τ1)] = s1 + τN + (s1 + τ1)
p1q
1− p1q . (14)
With this, we can study how the properties s1 and q of state i = 1 and those of the
coarse-grained state S (i.e., τ1, τN , p1) contribute to the overall fixation time. Consider
for example the simple model system given by N = 4 and
T+1 =
1+β
2 , T
−
1 =
1−β
2 (15)
T+2 = T
−
2 = T
+
3 = T
−
3 =
1
2 (16)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ 1 introduces a net bias towards moving into S when positioned at i = 1.
This is a special case of the constant-step process analyzed in (Altrock et al., 2010),
one of the most basic models exhibiting the phenomenon of stochastic slowdown. In
this model, we have T+1 + T
−
1 = 1 independently of β, so that s1 does not depend
on β. At the same time the subsystem S is composed of sites i = 2 and i = 3, and
the corresponding transition rates T±2 and T
±
3 are independent of β. The only relevant
model variable affected by changes in β is q = (1 + β)/2 so that tN1 increases as β is
increased (note here that the term p1q/(1 − p1q) is increasing and highly non-linear in
q). Thus, the fixation time tN1 increases with β, despite the fact that with increasing β
the system tends to move towards N .
Intuitively, the slowdown effect in this toy model can be understood as follows: Consider
an ensemble of (independent) realizations of the birth-death process, all started at t =
0 in state i = 1. These realizations may be thought of as particles hopping about
independently on the set of available states i = 0, i = 1, S and i = N . At a given
time t > 0 a number of such particles will have been absorbed at i = 0 and i = N ,
a number of particles will be located at i = 1, and a further set of particles will be
in state S. Whenever a particular particle leaves state S and enters state i = 1 it is
returned (after some waiting time) into the pool of occupants of S with probability q.
With probability 1− q it is absorbed at i = 0 (again after some waiting time). Increasing
the model parameter q and thus returning an increased fraction of such particles into the
subsystem S will (on average) increase the typical ‘age’ of particles in the pool at state
S. Given that all particles being absorbed at i = N are drawn from this pool of particles
in state S, this will in turn lead to an increased age among the particles arriving at i = N ,
and hence an increased conditional fixation time tN1 . While this intuitive interpretation of
stochastic slowdown is valid for the toy model of the constant-step process, the interplay
between the different factors contributing to the conditional fixation time is more intricate
P.M. Altrock, A. Traulsen, and T. Galla 8
The mechanics of stochastic slowdown in evolutionary games
in other birth-death processes, such as the frequency dependent Moran process. In the
remainder of the paper we will study these effects in the context of evolutionary games.
Furthermore, other counter-intuitive effects are found, including multiple extrema of the
conditional fixation time as a function of selection strength.
Symbol Definition
S Subsystem consisting of all states i = 2, ..., N−1.
q Conditional probability of a transition from 1 into S, q = T+1 /(T
+
1 + T
−
1 ).
s1 Average time spent in state 1 between arrival and subsequent departure, s1 =
1/(T+1 + T
−
1 ).
p1 Conditional probability that the system leaves S into i = 1.
τ1, τN Average times between entering S and leaving again into 1,N .
ρ(k) Conditional probability of fixation in 0, or N , given that the initial state 1 is visited
exactly k times.
ρN (k) ρN (k) = ρ(k)/φ1.
β Net bias towards moving from i = 1 into S.
Table 2: Additional symbols used exclusively in Section 3.
4. Game Dynamics
We consider frequency dependent selection in evolutionary games between two types
A and B. The payoff to each of the two interacting individuals is a if they are both of type
A, whereas two interacting individuals of type B receive d each upon mutual interaction.
An A interacting with a B receives b, whereas B obtains c in this situation. This defines
a symmetric 2× 2 game with the payoff matrix
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
(17)
We assume that the interaction between individuals occur on a much faster time scale
than the birth-death dynamics, so that the payoff of an individual is given by the ex-
pected payoff obtained from interaction with a randomly chosen individual. These aver-
age payoffs are then given by
piA =
a(i− 1) + b(N − i)
N − 1 , (18)
piB =
c i+ d(N − i− 1)
N − 1 , (19)
for players of types A and B, respectively. We have here excluded self-interaction. It
is worth mentioning that the average payoffs in such games are (affine) linear in the
frequency, i, of player of type A.
In order to define the evolutionary process we need to specify how the payoffs for each
of the two strategies determine the success in reproduction. Reproductive success is
determined by fitness, which in turn is a function of the average payoff received by a
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particular strategy. We denote fitness for the two types of players by fA and fB, respec-
tively. Several choices are possible for the mapping from payoff, see Eqs. (18,19), to
fitness. Nature does not tell us what fitness function to apply, but, by definition, fitness is
a monotonically increasing function of the payoff (Wu et al., 2010). Following (Traulsen
et al., 2008), we choose
fA = exp(βpiA), (20)
fB = exp(βpiB). (21)
While this a special choice, the phenomena discussed here are also present for other
choices, e.g., a linear payoff-to-fitness mapping. It is important to remember that payoff
and fitness are both frequency dependent. The parameter β, referred to as the inten-
sity of selection, determines how strongly the payoff from an individual’s interactions
influences fitness. For vanishing selection intensity (β = 0), evolution is neutral for any
game, i.e., no strategy has an advantage over the other in any state of the population.
In our setup we have fA = fB = 1 for β = 0.
In order to define the actual dynamics of the systems we make use of the frequency
dependent Moran process (Moran, 1962; Nowak et al., 2004). In this process the tran-
sition probabilities of the birth-death process are given by
T+i =
i
N
(N − i)
N
fA
f
, (22)
T−i =
i
N
(N − i)
N
fB
f
, (23)
T 0i = 1− T+i − T−i , (24)
where f = iN fA +
N−i
N fB is the expected fitness of a randomly chosen individual in
the population. We point out that this is a one-step process, so at each step of the
dynamics at most one replacement of an individual by another occurs. Accordingly, the
transition rates between states i and j vanish for all |i− j| > 1.
The transition probabilities in Eqs. (22,23,24) depend only on the ratio of the fitness
values, fA/fB. Given the exponential fitness mapping, this ratio in turn only depends on
the average payoff difference piA − piB. The same dependence on the payoff difference
is also obtained for many other mappings in the case of linear weak selection (Bladon
et al., 2010; Wu et al., 2010). In our case, the payoff difference is linear in i and it can
hence be written in the form piA − piB = u i+ v. For games of the specific form given in
Eq. (17) we have
u =
a+ d− (b+ c)
N − 1 , (25)
v = b− d+ b− a
N − 1 . (26)
These two parameters govern the frequency dependent evolutionary dynamics. The
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frequency dependent term proportional to u measures the cumulated success of pure
interactions (A-A, and B-B) versus the success of mixed interactions (A-B, and B-A).
The constant contribution is proportional to v, which roughly gives a measure for the
‘invasion barrier’ of an A mutant, i.e., the performance of A-B versus B-B, minus a
small correction from A-B versus A-A interactions.
In addition, the roots of the gradient of selection, T+i − T−i , i.e., the points i∗ for which
there is no net advantage to either strategy, can also be written in terms of u, and v.
Solving T+i∗−T−i∗ = 0 leads to i∗ = 0, N , and i∗ = −v/u. We point out that this latter point
need not be an integer, and that it may lie outside the space of allowed configurations,
i.e., we may have i∗ < 0 or i∗ > N – in these cases A is always advantageous over B
or vice versa. For 0 < i∗ < N , we either have a coexistence game or a coordination
game.
5. Results and Discussion
Neutral Evolution
Neutral evolution is the natural benchmark case of a strategy’s evolutionary success,
both in population genetics and in evolutionary games in finite populations (Ewens,
2004; Nowak, 2006a). Neutral evolution emerges in the special case of piA−piB = 0 for
any i and β, or generally for β = 0. This leads to T+i = T
−
i , and thus to
φij =
{
N−i
N−j for i > j
i
j for i ≤ j,
(27)
see Appendix Appendix A. The neutral transition probabilities read
T±i =
i(N − i)
N2
, (28)
such that the probability of returning to state i, Eq. (5), under neutrality becomes
ri = 1− 1/N. (29)
Hence, using Eq. (7) the unconditional average sojourn times are
tij =
{
N N−iN−j for i > j
N ij for i ≤ j.
(30)
The unconditional average fixation times follow from a summation over all j. With
some basic algebra this summation leads to the unconditional average fixation time
ti = N i (HN−1 −Hi−1) + N(N − i) (HN−1 −HN−i), where we use the notation Hk to
indicate harmonic numbers, see definition in Table 1, or Eq. (B.9) in the Appendix.
The neutral conditional average fixation times can be found in a similar way, by multiply-
ing with φj/φi = j/i, and summing over j, Eq. (9). The part of the sum with i > j thus
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has terms of the form ji
N−i
N−j . In the other part of the sum with i ≤ j, the ratios cancel,
which gives a constant contribution. Terms in initial state i factor out, such that we find
tNi =
N(N − i)
i
(N(HN−1 −HN−i) + 1) . (31)
For a single mutant (i = 1) the conditional average fixation time under neutral conditions
is thusN2−N time steps, orN−1 generations. Note that in fact neutral evolution means
T±i ≤ 1/4, so that the probability for the process to stay put, 1 − T+i − T−i , is greater
than 1/2, making the neutral process ‘lazy’ in the terminology of Montenegro and Tetali
(2006)).
Neutral evolution serves as the reference baseline, and we ask how weak (but non-
vanishing), intermediate, and strong selection changes the conditional fixation times
with respect to this benchmark. We focus our analysis on classical evolutionary games
exhibiting counterintuitive behavior of fixation times as a function of selection intensity.
For these cases we investigate weak and strong selection (β
ll1, and β → ∞, respectively). In these cases it is possible to derive closed-form
analytical results for the conditional fixation times, and seemingly contradictory results
may be found. For example the weak selection limit can indicate that small, but non-
zero selection strength can lead to a slowdown of fixation, i.e., the conditional fixation
times are higher than in the case of neutral evolution. On the other hand, a speedup
effect can be seen for the same game in the limit of strong selection, indicating non-
monotonic behavior of the conditional fixation time as a function of selection strength, a
feature that we will investigate in more detail below.
Weak Selection
The concept of weak selection is essential to many recent findings in evolutionary game
theory (Nowak et al., 2004; Nowak, 2006b; Traulsen and Nowak, 2006; Ohtsuki et al.,
2006; Tarnita et al., 2009). The weak selection limit here refers to a linearization of
the effects of the game in terms of small values of the selection intensity β. In this
limit the evolutionary game results in a small frequency dependent bias in addition to
the undirected random drift of neutral evolution. Weak selection serves as a powerful
first estimate of how selective bias and fluctuations in small populations influence each
other. We can thus make use of a large body of existing results on fixation times.
As one novelty we establish the weak selection approximation of the average sojourn
times. We do not present full mathematical details here, some of the main results can
be found in Appendix Appendix B.
Two relevant quantities for time scales in evolutionary games are given by the uncondi-
tional and conditional average fixation times of a single mutant, t1, and tN1 . Remarkably,
the fixation times under weak selection have a very simple dependence on the under-
ling the evolutionary game (Altrock and Traulsen, 2009b). One finds the weak selection
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approximations
t1 ≈ N HN−1 + E˜2
6
vβ, (32)
tN1 ≈ N(N − 1)−N(N − 1)
Eˆ1
36
uβ, (33)
where the game parameters enter in the distinct forms of Eqs. (25), and (26). The
coefficients E˜2, and Eˆ1 in these expansions depend only on the population size N and
on the state i, but not on the game parameters. Detailed expressions are given in
Appendix Appendix B.
Strong selection
The specific choice we made for the mapping from payoffs to fitness, fA = exp(βpiA),
fB = exp(βpiB), allows a strong selection limit; Altrock and Traulsen (2009a) have dis-
cussed strong selection (β → ∞) for a closely related process with selection at birth
and at death. We consider the limiting case of strong selection in order to compare it
with the weak selection approximation. A natural question to ask is: Do weak selection
approximation and strong selection limit agree qualitatively? As discussed below, some
games show a slowdown at small selection strength, the weak-selection limit predicts
an increase of fixation time with increasing selection. On the other hand, in the strong
selection limit of the same games the beneficial mutant can also fixate faster than in the
neutral limit. Hence the time-to-fixation can be non-monotonic in the selection intensity.
The transition probabilities as defined in Eqs. (22, 23), can be written as T±i = i(N −
i)/N2 g±i , see also (Bladon et al., 2010). For the specific dynamics we study here, we
have
g+i =
1
i
N (1− e−β(piA−piB)) + e−β(piA−piB)
, (34)
g−i = e
−β(piA−piB) g+i . (35)
As we are interested in the slowdown effect, we will now restrict the detailed analysis
to cases in which strategy A is always favored by selection, irrespective of the state i of
the population, i.e., to cases in which piA > piB, that is exp(−β(piA−piB)) < 1. The other
cases follow in a similar way, and we refer to the discussion in (Altrock and Traulsen,
2009a). Taking the limit of infinite selection strength we obtain
lim
β→∞
g+i = N/i, (36)
lim
β→∞
g−i = 0, (37)
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and we have
lim
β→∞
T+i =
N − i
N
, (38)
lim
β→∞
T−i = 0 (39)
for the transition probabilities per time step. Hence, the A mutant will always spread, but
the process remains stochastic, as T+i < 1 for all internal states. The strong-selection
limit of the probability to ever reach state j, starting from i, is
lim
β→∞
φij =
{
1 if i ≤ j,
0 else.
(40)
Especially, fixation of A occurs with probability one, φi → 1, which implies tNi → ti.
Nevertheless, because of non-vanishing waiting probabilities T 0i = 1 − T+i , the fixation
times still fluctuate. For the return probability, Eq. (5), we simply obtain rj = j/N , so
that we have
lim
β→∞
tij =
{
N
N−j if i ≤ j,
0 else
(41)
for the average sojourn times. The average fixation time is the sum over all sojourn
times, which amounts to
ti =
N−1∑
j=i
N
N − j = N HN−i, (42)
where Hk are the harmonic numbers, see Table 1. Equation (42) is the asymptotic
result for the unconditional and conditional average fixation time of advantageous A
mutants in the limit of strong selection. If B is favored by selection instead, a similar
analysis can be carried out, leading to ti = N(HN−1 − HN−i−1) in the limit of strong
selection.
Coordination games have a more intricate dependency on the initial condition, but we
note that the derivation is analogous to the cases of simple dominance above. For
coexistence games, the fixation times diverge with the selection intensity β, which can
be shown by arguing that there exist an internal state j1, and an adjacent internal state
j2 = j1 + 1, such that T−i<j1 → 0, and T+i>j2 → 0 for all other internal states i in the
limit of strong selection. Hence, rj1 , rj2 → 1, and the sojourn times tij1 and tij2 diverge,
irrespective of the state i from which the dynamics is started. Thus the fixation time
diverges as well.
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5.1. Two Generic Examples: Prisoner’s Dilemma and Coexistence
Let us now reduce the analysis to games with fixed a = 0, and d = 1. The payoff matrix
then reads
(A B
A 0 b
B c 1
)
(43)
For c < 0 and b > 1, we have a Prisoner’s Dilemma, in which the invading mutant A
corresponds to defection, and the wildtype B corresponds to cooperation: The punish-
ment for mutual defection is zero, the reward for mutual cooperation is one, both are kept
fixed. The two free parameters of the game are then the temptation to defect against
a cooperator, b, and the suckers payoff for cooperating with a defector, c. Defection
dominates cooperation, for each frequency defectors have a higher payoff than cooper-
ators. As defectors spread, the average fitness decreases monotonically. We will here
be interested in the fixation of defectors in finite populations, starting from a situation in
which there is one defector initially. Questions we will ask are then for example: Given
that the defectors eventually take over, how long does this take, and how does it depend
on the selection strength? As explained above, our benchmark when testing the effects
of selection is the case of neutral evolution, tN1 = N
2 − N . Naively, one would expect
that increasing the selection strength should enhance the evolutionary advantage of
defectors, and hence reduce the time to fixation at the all-defect absorbing state. As we
will see below, the behavior of the system is much more intricate, though.
We start by analyzing the weak-selection limit. For the generic subset of games that
fulfill b + c > 1, the linear weak selection approximation predicts an increasing time
to fixation of one initial defector as a function of selection strength. This can be seen
from the analytical results presented in more detail in the Appendix, see in particular
Eq. (B.10), where we note that Eˆ2 vanishes for a single initial defector. One then finds
that the difference between the conditional fixation time at small selection intensity and
that at neutrality is of the form −C(N)uβ (compare Eqs. (25), (33)), where c(N) is a
constant which only depends on the population size, and where C(N) > 0 for N ≥ 3,
compare also to (Altrock and Traulsen, 2009b; Taylor et al., 2006). As a consequence,
the conditional fixation time increases under weak selection when u = 1−b−c < 0, i.e.,
when b − c > 1, the conditional fixation time at low non-zero intensities of selection is
then higher than in the neutral case. In the limit of strong selection, on the other hand,
we expect that the conditional fixation time approaches the value N HN−1, Eq. (42),
which is less than the neutral result of N(N − 1) (the harmonic numbers diverge loga-
rithmically in N ). This implies a non-monotonic behavior of tN1 as a function of β, with
at least one maximum at intermediate values of the intensity of selection.
In order to confirm this further, we plot the semi-analytical solution of the conditional
fixation time from a single defector mutant, as obtained from explicitly carrying out the
sum in Eq. (9), in Figure 2. For c = −0.1 and b = 5.0, the conditional fixation time
depends non-monotonically on the intensity of selection: If the intensity of selection is
roughly below 0.07, fixation is expected to take longer than neutral. The analytical curve
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Figure 2: Prisoner’s Dilemma: Non-monotonic fixation time. Average conditional fixation time of a
single defecting mutant in a population of cooperators, relative to the case of neutral evolution (quantity
shown is tN1 (β)/tN1 (0) − 1) for N = 20. The fixation time under neutral evolution is t201 (0) = 380, see
Eq. (31). The main panel shows the result for small selection intensity, the inset depicts larger values
of β. Solid lines are the semi-analytical solution, Eq. (9), grey dots are from Monte-Carlo simulations
(106 independent realizations). The fixation time approaches a value of N HN−1 for β → ∞, Eq. (42).
Accordingly, tN1 (β)/tN1 (0)− 1 approaches ≈ −0.81, as seen in the inset.
is corroborated by results from individual based Monte-Carlo simulations of the under-
lying birth-death process. It is interesting to note that while the behavior of tN1 (β) is
nonlinear with an intermediate maximum, the actual slowdown, i.e., the initial increase
of tN1 with the selection intensity β occurs in the regime of weak selection. The max-
imum in fixation time is seen when selection intensity is of order 1/N . The slowdown
effect is only relatively small in our example (approximately 4% relative to the neutral
case). This is due to special features of the Moran process and to the numerical values
we have chosen for the payoff matrix; the increase in fixation time can be much larger
in other frequency dependent microscopic processes, as discussed in (Altrock et al.,
2010).
Slowdown in a social dilemma game, where cooperation is dominated by defection, is
a phenomenon of small population size, it vanishes with increasing population size in
the following sense: the larger the population, the smaller the range of selection in-
tensities to observe slowdown. More specifically the range over which the slowdown
occurs scales as 1/N . This holds for the frequency-dependent Moran process, its vari-
ant studied here, imitation processes, as well as the Wright-Fisher process (Altrock and
Traulsen, 2009b; Wu et al., 2010). The non-monotonic behavior of average fixation
times is influenced by the payoff structure of the game in a complex manner, and it is
hard to predict for which parameter ranges slowdown is extreme. However, as shown
in (Altrock et al., 2010), stochastic slowdown occurs in a variety of simple microscopic
processes, and is facilitated in systems with only a small number of selective states and
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Figure 3: Prisoner’s Dilemma: Sojourn times. The conditional average sojourn time in state j =
1, . . . , N − 1 of a single defecting mutant in a population of cooperators, rescaled relative to the neutral
case (quantity shown is tN1 j(β)/tN1 j(0) − 1) for four different values of selection intensity β as indicated
in each panel. Shaded bars refer to the exact analytical solution φj/φit1,j , dots are obtained from 106
independent individual based Monte-Carlo simulations of the evolutionary Moran process. For small β, the
total additional time spent in states close to j = N exceeds the time gain in the states close to j = 0 and
slowdown occurs. Payoff values a = 0.0, b = 5.0, c = −0.1, d = 1.0, population size N = 20.
a large range of almost neutral states.
In order to understand the slowdown effect and the non-monotonicity of the time-to-
fixation in more detail, we can ask where the process spends most of its time, i.e., we
consider the conditional sojourn times, tN1,j for the intermediate states j = 2, 3, . . . , N−1.
Results from our semi-analytical calculations and from simulations are shown in Fig-
ure 3. As before we compare results from the selection scenario to those for neutral
evolution. The neutral conditional sojourn time in each frequency j does not depend
on either of the two states, i or j, but only on the population size N , limβ→0 tNij =
limβ→0[φj/φi ti j ] = N . The reason is that the fixation probability in each state in-
creases linearly in j, e.g., φj/φi = j/i. This compensates the asymmetry of the neutral
unconditional sojourn times, which decrease inversely with increasing distance from
initial condition, e.g., tij = N i/j.
The independence on the intermediate states no longer holds for β > 0, see Appendix
Appendix B. The non-monotonicity of the conditional fixation time of an advantageous
defector results from a competition of two effects: We observe in Figure 3 that the
system spends less time in states of low frequencies of defectors, j, than under neu-
tral evolution, but that states of high frequencies are sojourned more often than in the
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neutral regime. The increase of the conditional sojourn times close to the absorbing
boundary i = N is a combined effect of high waiting probabilities (low transition rates
T±i ), and the fact that processes conditioned on fixation in N are treated as having a
reflecting boundary in i = 0. If selection is sufficiently weak, the reduction in sojourn
times for states with low j is relatively small, and only occurs for a few states. The ma-
jority of states experience an increased sojourn time relative to neutral. Thus, the initial
gain in speed due to positive selection cannot compensate the later time loss. As the
strength of selection increases, more and more states experience an effective reduction
in sojourn times (see Figure 3) and the relative time gain in each of these states also
increases. An increased sojourn time relative to the neutral case is now only found near
the j = N state, so that the reduction at the beginning of the evolutionary trajectory now
dominates, leading to a speedup.
We point out that the seemingly counterintuitive slowdown and the non-monotonic be-
havior of tN1 as a function of β rests in the fact that we condition on fixation in N . We
consider only the ensemble of trajectories that eventually fixate in N , this ensemble
naturally grows with increasing frequency dependent selection, but the average time
it takes any of these trajectories to reach state N shows complex behavior and the
slowdown effect.
Next we discuss the behavior of tN1 (β) for the snowdrift game representing the class of
coexistence games, b > 1 and c > 0. In these games, A can invade B and B can invade
A, a stable coexistence of the two strategies typically evolves. The snowdrift game is
chosen frequently as a representative of this class (Doebeli et al., 2004; Doebeli and
Hauert, 2005): Cooperators can be invaded by defectors as the temptation to defect
is still larger than the reward of mutual cooperation. However, cooperating against a
defector now yields a payoff greater than mutual defection, such that cooperation and
defection can coexist in a population. The snowdrift game is a social dilemma, as
selection does not favor the social optimum of mutual cooperation.
Again, we denote wildtypes B as cooperators and the mutants A as defectors. In co-
existence games, the frequency dependent fitness difference fA − fB is positive at low
numbers of cooperators. A population consisting mostly of cooperators can hence be
invaded by defectors. Once the number of defectors has reached a certain threshold,
the fitness advantage is reversed, fA − fB becomes negative. In the corresponding
deterministic replicator equation, this leads to a stable fixed point at which both types
coexist. The stochastic dynamics of finite populations of individuals interacting in co-
existence games will still fixate into the absorbing all-A or all-B states eventually. But
due to the deterministic flux towards the coexistence fixed point, the time-to-fixation di-
verges rapidly with selection pressure (Traulsen et al., 2007a). Our numerical analysis,
however, reveals that there are generic subsets of coexistence games in which the con-
ditional fixation time can decrease for intermediate values of selection, as illustrated in
the example of Figure 4.
The dependence of tN1 (β) on β is surprisingly intricate. The conditional fixation time
tN1 shows two extrema as a function of the selection strength. In order to present a
more complete picture we complement the calculation of fixation times by results for
conditional sojourn times in Figure 5 for several values of the selection pressure. The
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Figure 4: Coexistence of A and B: Non-monotonic fixation time. Conditional average fixation time of
a single mutant, measured relative to the neutral case (quantity plotted is tN1 (β)/tN1 (0) − 1). The fixation
time under neutral evolution is t301 (0) = 870, see Eq. (31). The payoff values of the coexistence game
are a = 0.0, b = 1.2, c = 0.1, d = 1.0, in a population of size 30 individuals. The black lines are the
exact analytical solution, Eq. (9), grey dots are from individual based Monte-Carlo simulations (5 · 105
independent realizations). Inset: For very strong selection, the fixation time diverges.
typical picture is that, at non-zero selection strength, states of low frequency of A are
visited substantially less often than under neutrality, but the fixation process spends long
periods at high-frequency states. At low (but non-zero) selection strength the number
of states near j = 1 that experience a reduced sojourn time is small (see Figure 5). The
majority of states is subject to an increase in sojourn time relative to the neutral case,
leading to an overall increase the fixation time. At intermediate strength of selection
a sizeable fraction of states experiences a substantial reduction of sojourn times (see
e.g., the case β = 5 in Figure 5), this effect dominates over the effective slowdown in
states near j = N . The net effect of these two competing forces is then an overall
speedup. Unlike in the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma however, in which virtually all
states experience a reduction in sojourn time at strong selection (see Figure 3), the
set of states in which sojourn times are reduced is limited in the coexistence game
studied in Figure 5. Even for very large values of β ≈ 20 we find that sojourn times are
increased compared to neutral for states j approximately above j = 20 in a population
of N = 30. At the same time the sojourn time in these states near j = N increases
considerably as β is increased (see lower right panel of Figure 5), leading to an overall
slowdown effect, and ultimately to a conditional fixation time which diverges with β.
Analysis of Generic 2× 2 Games
Here we describe the behavior of more general 2 × 2 games, parametrized by b, and
c, with fixed a = 0, and d = 1. This results in a parameter plane, spanned by b and c.
While this is a reduction of the space of all possible games, all generic types of 2 × 2
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Figure 5: Coexistence of A and B: Sojourn times. Conditional average sojourn time in state j =
1, . . . , N−1 of a single defecting mutant in a population of cooperators, relative to the neutral case (quantity
shown is tN1 j(β)/tN1 j(0) − 1), using four different values of the selection intensity β as indicated in the
four panels. Shaded bars refer to the exact analytical solution φj/φit1,j , dots are obtained from 105
independent individual based Monte-Carlo simulations of the evolutionary Moran process. Payoff values
are a = 0.0, b = 1.2, c = 0.1, d = 1.0, population size N = 30.
evolutionary games are captured by this parameterization (Weibull, 1995). In particular
one has a coordination game for b < 1, c < 0, a Prisoner’s Dilemma type game for
b > 1, c < 0 and a harmony game for b < 1, c > 0. The region b > 1, c > 0 represents
coexistence games. We now ask whether the conditional fixation time tN1 as a function
of β has nontrivial solutions of tN1 (β) = t
N
1 (0). If there are such solutions, then assuming
that tN1 is smooth, there has to be at least one extremum. For systems with slowdown,
the single extremum is a maximum. In cases where one finds speed-up there can be
two extrema, a maximum and a minimum.
We are interested in the type of complexity the resulting curves show depending on b,
and c, i.e., how many extrema one should expect as a function of selection strength. In
what follows we will discuss the generic classes of 2× 2 games separately.
Coordination games (b < 1, and c < 0): In this case, our numerical analysis reveals,
that no maxima or minima in the fixation time are possible. However, there is a finite
strong selection limit, lower than that of neutral evolution. Hence the fixation time can
be assumed to decrease monotonically with increasing selection.
Prisoner’s Dilemma (b > 1, c < 0), and Harmony Game (b < 1, c > 0): Games with
b > 1, and c < 0 are called social dilemmas because the social optimum is not the dom-
inant strategy. Complementary, the dilemma is resolved if b < 1, and c > 0, where mu-
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tual cooperation is dominant. In both cases, we can observe slowdown for sufficiently
weak selection, followed by a speedup for strong selection. This is seen if b+c > 1, oth-
erwise the conditional time-to-fixation simply decreases in β. In both quadrants of the
parameter plane, the line that formally separates slowdown games from non-slowdown
games is given by the set of games with equal gains from switching, c = 1− b.
Coexistence games (b > 1, and c > 0): Here, fixation times have always been believed
to diverge quickly with increasing selection. Our previous discussion reveals that for
N = 20
N = 10
N = 30
A B
C D
Figure 6: Phases of possible non-monotonic behavior of the fixation time tN1 , as a function of β
in the game plane parameterized by b and c. Panel A shows a schematic drawing of the parameter
space, the small inset figures depict the qualitative shape of the conditional fixation time tN1 as a function
of the selection strength β. The parameters plane can be split into four quadrants separated by the vertical
line of b = 1, and the horizontal line of c = 0. The lower left quadrant defines coordination games. The
lower right quadrant defines a Prisoner’s Dilemma game with dominance of A over B. In the upper right
quadrant, strategies A, and B define a coexistence game, in the upper left one, B dominates (sometimes
called ‘harmony game’). The black line c = 1 − b (along which all games have the equal-gains-from-
switching property) separates the two regimes in which the conditional fixation time tN1 increases (above),
or decreases (below) with increasing linear weak selection. In the coexistence quadrant we schematically
draw dashed lines that separate different regimes of non-monotonic behavior of the conditional fixation time
tN1 with selection intensity β. The three following panels B, C, and D scan the b − c plane for the number
of non-trivial solutions of tN1 (β) = tN1 (0); Bright shading means one solution (hence one extreme value),
dark shading means two solutions (hence two extreme values) for finite β. In the white regions tN1 (β) has
no extrema as a function of β. In the three examples shown in panels B, C and D, the parameter area in
which a coexistence game has two extrema in tN1 (β) increases as N is increased.
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intermediate levels of selection, there is the possibility of a speedup, although initially,
the fixation time increases as predicted by the linear weak selection approximation.
Figure 6 shows in which parts of the coexistence regime there can be a strongly non-
monotonic dependence of the conditional fixation times on the intensity of selection, as
shown in the example of Figure 4.
In accordance with the scaling analysis in (Altrock et al., 2010), non-monotonic behavior
of tN1 that leads to the pattern in Figure 6 vanishes with increasing population size. For
large populations, the range of the selection strength in which slowdown is found scales
as 1/N .
Note also that in Figure 6 (B-D) the regime of slowdown, to be observed in games where
one strategy dominates the other, reaches into the game parameter area of coexistence
games. This is due to the observation that in finite populations, not every game in which
the deterministic dynamics predicts an mixed equilibrium is in fact a coexistence game.
There is a finite size correction to the equilibrium value. If the equilibrium is below 1/N ,
or above 1 − 1/N , a formal coexistence game rather describes dominance in a finite
population.
6. Conclusions
The study of cooperation in an evolutionary context mainly focuses on mechanism that
allow the emergence and maintenance of cooperation (see e.g., Axelrod and Hamilton,
1981; Maynard Smith, 1982b; Nowak, 2006b; Santos et al., 2006; Sigmund et al., 2010;
Hilbe and Traulsen, 2012; van Veelen et al., 2012). In well-mixed populations, coop-
eration cannot be maintained when defection emerges unless mechanisms promoting
cooperation are present, such as repetition, punishment, or rewarding. Nonetheless,
in small groups of cooperators that are bound to be invaded by defectors stochastic
effects can have a beneficial impact (Cremer et al., 2012), leading to a possible delay
of the extinction of cooperation. Nowak (2012) summarizes important steps in the un-
derstanding of cooperation from an evolutionary perspective, and also points out future
challenges in the experimental study of human cooperation. Our analysis here can be
seen as a next step towards a more intuitive understanding of large fluctuations, the
time a dominated strategy can be expected to be maintained, and the importance of
the particular game that is being played to overall fitness.
In summary we have studied the time-to-fixation in finite populations of individuals inter-
acting in 2×2 games, subject to a birth-death process. In particular we have focused on
the detailed mechanics of a stochastic slowdown effect, previously reported for simple
evolutionary processes in (Altrock et al., 2010). The term slowdown refers to cases of
non-zero selection strength in which fixation of a single advantageous mutant in a pop-
ulation takes longer on average than in the neutral case. Our analysis proceeds partly
based on numerical simulations and partly by exact mathematics, the latter resulting
in closed-form expressions for fixation times which are then evaluated numerically. We
derive the weak and strong selection limits of these relations. Considerations of a sim-
ple toy model complement our mathematical analysis of the more intricate and complex
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games. For simple-birth death processes we can identify a small set of model param-
eters contributing to the time-to-fixation, and hence the competing effects leading to
slowdown or speedup can be disentangled.
Depending on the specific choice of the payoff matrix we find intricate functional de-
pendence of the fixation time on the intensity of selection, with non-monotonicities and
multiple intermediate extrema. Generic instances of the Prisoner’s Dilemma may ex-
hibit an initial slowdown of fixation at low, but non-zero selection strength, followed by a
speedup into a faster-than-neutral regime at strong selection. In coexistence games we
have identified an initial slowdown at low selection, followed by a speedup at intermedi-
ate intensity of selection, followed again by a slowdown. In order to systematize these
different types of behavior we have classified the parameter plane of 2×2 games, char-
acterized by two generic game parameters, according to the complexity their respective
conditional fixation times show as a function of selection strength.
As a second main contribution we have linked fixation times and the slowdown effect
to average sojourn times, i.e., to the time the system spends in different states before
fixation into the all-mutant absorbing state occurs. We find that the slowdown (relative
to the case of neutral evolution) is caused by an increase of the time spent near the
all-mutant state. The time spent near the all-wildtype state is reduced increasingly as
selection strength sets in. Both effects compete, and can result in a non-monotonic
behavior of the conditional fixation time, such as the one shown in Figure 2.
While we focus on 2 × 2 games and restrict the discussion to a variant of the Moran
process, we expect the slowdown effect and possible non-monotonic behavior of condi-
tional fixation times to play a role in other systems as well. The connection between the
evolutionary game with payoff matrix (17), and the evolutionary dynamics of two alleles,
A and B, at a single locus in a population of diploid organisms with random pairing of
gametes is, for example, discussed by Traulsen and Reed (2012). Given these paral-
lels it will not be surprising if a stochastic slowdown is to occur in model systems in
population genetics with directional selection.
While we appreciate that slowdown effects may not have been found in real-world ex-
perimental systems so far, we would like to argue that – up to recently – there has not
been much reason to look for them systematically. We hope that our theoretical findings
may stimulate a discussion of how long a beneficial mutation needs to reach fixation in
a population, especially in systems for which there exist estimates of selection strength
and fitness function. With such systems in mind, we hope that it may then be possible
to test the applicability of our findings in real-world systems.
We would like to conclude by briefly addressing the symmetry in conditional fixation
times, discovered by Antal and Scheuring (2006) and Taylor et al. (2006): One has
tN1 = t
0
N−1 for all 2 × 2 games in finite populations with two strategies A and B, for all
microscopic birth-death dynamics and any selection strength (excluding pathological
cases in which some of the transition rates vanish). The conditional average fixation
time of a single A individual is always the same as that of a single B individual. Given
this rather surprising symmetry it is natural so ask whether conditional sojourn times
have a similar property, i.e., whether φj/φ1t1j = (1−φj)/(1−φ1)tN−1j? Here, a numer-
ical comparison suggests that this is indeed the case, see also (Taylor et al., 2006).
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Appendix
Appendix A. Stationary Probabilities
For the probability to ever visit state j before absorption, starting from i, the recursion
φij = (1− T+i − T−i )φij + T+i φi+1j + T−i φi−1j holds. For i = j, we simply find φii = 1.
For i > j, the solution of the recursion with absorbing boundaries 0, N is (Ewens, 2004)
φij =
∑N−1
k=i
∏k
m=j+1
T−m
T+m∑N−1
k=j
∏k
m=j+1
T−m
T+m
. (A.1)
For i < j, solving the recursion leads to
φij =
∑i−1
k=0
∏k
m=1
T−m
T+m∑j−1
k=0
∏k
m=1
T−m
T+m
, (A.2)
which yields the fixation probability φi = φiN as special case. Note that without mutation
rates absorption is the only possible outcome, φi0 = 1− φi.
Appendix B. Weak selection
The transition rates in state i up to first order in β read
T+i ≈
i(N − i)
N2
+
i(N − i)2
N3
(u i+ v)β, (B.1)
T−i ≈
i(N − i)
N2
− i
2(N − i)
N3
(u i+ v)β. (B.2)
For i > j, we obtain
φij ≈ N − i
N − j
(
1− (i− j)(i+ j +N)u+ 3 v
6
β
)
. (B.3)
For i < j, we find
φij ≈ i
j
(
1 + (j − i)(i+ j)u+ 3v
6
β
)
, (B.4)
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which recovers the 1/3-rule for i = 1 and j = N (Nowak et al., 2004; Lessard and
Ladret, 2007). The return probability in state j, before absorption, is given by rj =
1 +T+j (φj+1j − 1) +T−j (φj−1j − 1). The sojourn time in j on the other hand is related to
the escape probability rj from j, see Eq. (7). Up to first order in the selection intensity
we find
1
1− rj ≈ N +
(N + j2(N + 6)−N j(N + 3))u− 3(N − 2j)v
6
β. (B.5)
With this, and using Eq. (7) as well as Eqs. (B.3) and (B.4) we can compute the linear
weak selection approximation for the average sojourn time in j. For initial conditions
i > j this reads
tij ≈ N − i
N − j
(
N −
(
Dˆ1 u+ Dˆ2 v
)
β
)
, (B.6)
where the quantities Dˆ1 = (iN2 + (i2 − 1 + j(3 − 2j))N − 6j2)/6 and Dˆ2 = ((i − j +
1)N − 2j)/2 are independent of the selection intensity and the payoffs.
For initial conditions i < j we obtain
tij ≈ i
j
(
N −
(
Dˇ1 u+ Dˆ2 v
)
β
)
, (B.7)
where Dˇ1 = Dˆ1 + (N2(j − i))/6. This enables us to calculate the average life time of
the Markov chain between 0 and N under weak selection
ti =
N−1∑
j=1
tij
≈N i (HN−1 −Hi−1) +N(N − i) (HN−1 −HN−i) +
(
E˜1 u+ E˜2 v
) β
6
.
(B.8)
Here, we have written
Hk =
k∑
l=1
1
l
(B.9)
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for the harmonic numbers. The coefficients in Eq. (B.8) are given by
E˜1 =N(N − i)(N − 3)(i− 1)− iN(i2 − 1)(HN−1 −Hi−1)
+ (N − i)
(
(i− 1)(i(N + 3) +N(2N + 3))
−N(N − i+ 1)(2N + i+ 1)(HN−1 −HN−i)
)
,
E˜2 = i(N − i)3(N + 2)− 3iN(i+ 1)(HN−1 −Hi−1)
− (N − i)((i− 1)3(N + 2)− 18N(N − i+ 1)(HN−1 −HN−i).
For i = 1, the term E˜1 vanishes for all N such that the term proportional to u drop out in
Eq. (B.8). Thus the average life time of a single mutant is given by t1 ≈ NHN−1+(N2+
N − 2(1 +N HN−1)) v β/12, compare with the result by Altrock and Traulsen (2009b).
In a similar fashion, we can derive a weak-selection approximation for the conditional
average fixation time
tNi ≈
N(N − i)
i
(1 +N(HN−1 −HN−i))
+
N(N − i)
i
(
Eˆ1
36
u+
Eˆ2
2
v
)
β,
(B.10)
where
Eˆ1 = (6− 7i)N2 + 2(9 + (i− 9)i)N − 6(i2 − 1)
+ 6N(1 +N(N − i+ 3))(HN−1 −HN−i), ,
Eˆ2 =N(HN−1 −HN−i)− i+ 1.
The term Eˆ2 vanishes for all N if i = 1, and we arrive at the approximation tN1 ≈
N(N−1)(1−(N2−2N))uβ/36 (Taylor et al., 2006; Altrock and Traulsen, 2009b; Altrock
et al., 2010). The conditional extinction time of an initial group of i mutants under weak
selection is approximately
t0i ≈
N (N i(HN−1 −Hi−1)−N + i)
N − i
+
N
N − i
(
Eˇ1
36
u+
Eˇ2
2
v
)
β.
(B.11)
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Here
Eˇ1 = 6Ni(Ni+ 1)(HN−1 −Hi−1)
− (N − i)(5iN2 + 2i(3 + i)N − 6(i2 − 1)),
Eˇ2 = (N − i)(i+ 1)−Ni(HN−1 −Hi−1). (B.12)
We see that for i = N − 1, Eˇ2 vanishes, and Eˇ1(i = N − 1) = Eˆ1(i = 1), hence
t0N−1 = t
N
1 , which holds for any intensity of selection (Taylor et al., 2006; Antal and
Scheuring, 2006).
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